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Europe is increasingly present in the most economically 
vibrant region in the world. 
II. THE ECONOMIC PIVOT
A significant aspect of the EU’s balancing act towards 
Asia relates to economic policy. China, as Europe’s 
biggest trading partner in the region, embarked on 
a strategic cooperation agenda with the EU in 2003. 
The 2020 EU-China Strategic Agenda for Cooperation 
is a fairly ambitious comprehensive agreement that 
includes a range of precise measures to enhance 
cooperation and dialogue between the EU and Asia’s 
largest economic actor. China and the EU trade well 
over one billion euros per day, with a European trade 
deficit in 2016 of almost €175 billion affecting all 
member states except Germany and Finland.[6] EU 
imports from China are dominated by industrial and 
consumer goods: machinery and equipment, footwear 
and clothing, furniture, lamps and toys, for example. 
EU exports to China are concentrated on machinery 
and equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft, and chemicals, 
with a low percentage of services.[7] Nonetheless, tens 
of thousands of European jobs have been lost to low-
cost competition from China, alongside the reduction 
of real wages for semi-skilled EU workers.[8] China 
has also engaged in a variety of other unfair trade 
practices, such as currency manipulation, technology 
theft and transfer, as well as the influence of State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in all sectors, heavily 
impacting trade with the domestic economy. Moreover, 
China and the US compete with the EU for market 
share in all other Asian countries, a factor that could 
be mitigated by the signing of additional Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) in the region. 
The EU’s first strategic focus in Asia should be single-
minded pursuit of the further opening of the Chinese 
market. The main problem is that China’s trading 
relations with the rest of the world are still governed 
by the clauses of its 2001 accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The latter were designed when 
China was still a relatively poor country with a market 
of modest size; today, China has become the second 
largest economy (on a country basis) and the so-called 
“workshop of the world”, yet it continues to benefit from 
an obsolete WTO status as a developing country. China 
has been reluctant to change because it benefits from 
the status quo, allowing it to engage with the global 
economy on its own terms.[9] This involves a complex 
hybrid, which combines a free market economy in some 
sectors, along with substantial parts of the economy 
that are still state-owned. This “semi-protectionism” 
means that Western firms do not have the same level 
of access to the Chinese market compared with Chinese 
firms; the latter also benefit from much more favorable 
terms of access to Western markets. The EU should use 
a combination of carrots and sticks to encourage China 
to further open-up its economy. For example, Europe 
can rely on its significant voting rights within the WTO 
and use China’s desire to be granted market economy 
status within the organization to extract concessions.
[10] If China refuses to compromise, the EU could 
respond by expanding the number of items on their 
dual-use technology trade ban lists, and limit Chinese 
investment in technology start-up companies whose 
products may have eventual military implications. This 
should be enough to incentivize Beijing. However, such 
negotiations must be handled with great caution, as 
China may retaliate, and a full-blown trade war would 
be extremely damaging to both sides.  
A second strategic focus for the EU in Asia should be 
the signing of additional FTAs with states small and 
large in the region. Indeed, the difficulties of moving 
forward with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) under Trump leaves the EU with no 
other option than to reinforce trade ties with Asia as a 
substitute. It is common sense for Europe to reinforce 
trade with the world’s new economic powerhouse, in 
preparation for what some analysts predict could be 
the “Asian century”.[11] Already, Asia as a whole is 
Europe’s largest trading partner.[12] Following Trump’s 
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
many Asian countries are also looking for alternatives 
to compensate for America’s new protectionism. Over 
the last decade, the EU has enhanced its pivot to Asia, 
gradually building a web of partnerships. For instance, 
in addition to its strategic partnership with China, the 
EU has developed strong bilateral relations with Japan 
and India. Moreover, the EU has successfully concluded 
ambitious bilateral trade deals with Singapore, 
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Vietnam, as well as South Korea.
 
Nevertheless, despite these impressive achievements, 
the EU’s economic pivot towards Asia remains 
incomplete.[13] Indeed, there are still many Asian 
countries with which the EU has yet to begin trade 
talks; moreover, a number of negotiations have 
stalled over the last few years. For example, EU trade 
negotiations with Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Thailand have been slowed by the EU’s ‘search for 
the perfect FTA’[14], including European demands in 
terms of social and environmental protection. Likewise, 
initial hopes to launch ambitious trade discussions with 
Japan, as well as secure a bloc-to-bloc trade deal with 
ASEAN have so far failed to materialize. The same 
applies in the case of China, where the EU’s priority 
had been to secure a bilateral investment agreement, 
although negotiations have not progressed much over 
the last few years. Therefore, the EU should redouble 
efforts to bring all ongoing trade negotiations with its 
Asian partners to conclusion over the next few years. 
Although the EU succeeded in establishing a “strategic 
partnership” with India, this has not included a free 
trade deal, since negotiations have stalled due to 
disagreements over the opening up of the services 
sector.[15] Given that the US has no free trade agenda 
with India at the moment, the EU-India FTA could 
provide a considerable advantage for the EU in Asia, 
due to the vast potential of EU-India trade. According to 
one study, a Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement 
with India would increase the EU’s GDP by 2.2%, or 
€275 billion. In terms of jobs, an EU-India FTA could 
generate 2.2 million new jobs or 1% of the EU’s total 
workforce.[16]
Another significant aspect of the EU’s strategic pivot 
towards Asia has to do with environmental policy, 
which forms part of the EU’s overall economic balancing 
act. American President Donald Trump has made the 
decision to withdraw his country from the 2015 Paris 
accord, putting an end to the leadership role the US 
played in international climate change negotiations 
under Obama. This will open-up a vacuum, which will 
need to be filled. China has already announced that it 
seeks to continue its pivotal role in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Chance (UNFCCC) 
regardless of the attitude of the Trump administration. 
Chinese President Xi even confirmed in his first phone 
call with French President Macron his determination to 
protect the Paris accord.[17] National self-interest is 
pushing China towards a greener future, as the country 
faces an urgent environmental crisis that is threatening 
its economic progress, with about 1.6 million people 
dying each year due to pollution.[18] Beijing has 
already begun to implement one of the most ambitious 
environmental policy agendas in the world, becoming a 
global leader in renewable energies such as solar, wind 
or hydropower. China also seeks to rely on international 
climate change negotiations to enhance its position as 
a responsible power on the world stage and bolster its 
“soft power”.[19]
However, China will not be able to lead the international 
community on its own. Therefore, there is a need for 
EU-China joint leadership on global environmental 
issues.
 
As China is the first greenhouse gas emitter and the 
EU is the third, this may be sufficient to overcome 
disengagement from the US (the second largest 
emitter). Moreover, other major emitters, including 
India or Brazil, have also expressed their desire 
to continue efforts to implement and consolidate 
progress made during the latest Conferences of the 
Parties (COP21-22). The Trump administration’s lack 
of interest provides Europe with an opportunity to 
enhance cooperation with China on environmental 
issues, reinforcing a key aspect of the EU’s strategic 
“pivot to Asia”. Europe is ideally positioned to achieve 
this, as it intends to “lead by example” by launching 
the world’s most ambitious environmental legislation 
to implement the Paris accord, known as the “2030 
climate and energy framework”. The latter involves 
binding targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
at least 40% up to 2030 (from a 1990 baseline). This is 
to be achieved through a variety of policies, including 
modernizing the European Emissions Trading System 
by making it more energy efficient, with a target of at 
least 27% for renewable energies and energy savings, 
as well as completing the EU’s internal energy market.
[20] This is intended to provide the background for 
an even more ambitious target, which aims to reduce 
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greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% up to 2050. 
Nevertheless, while establishing a joint partnership 
with China is vital for safeguarding the Paris Accord, 
the EU should stop short of any sort of “special 
relationship” with China. This would risk legitimizing 
Beijing’s concept of “regime neutrality” and contradict 
European democratic values. Thus, while working in 
close partnership with China on issues such as climate 
change, Europe should not shy away from criticizing, 
when appropriate, human rights abuses, including 
President Xi’s increasingly authoritarian censorship of 
Chinese civil society. 
III. THE SECURITY PIVOT
Over the last decade, the EU has sought to complement 
and consolidate its economic pivot towards Asia by 
establishing key security partnerships with countries 
and organizations in the region. For example, the EU 
is a prominent member of the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM), a biennial forum created in 1996 to bring 
together European and Asian leaders. Likewise, the 
EU is the largest contributor of financial assistance to 
ASEAN and also supports other organizations such as 
the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC).[21] Unlike the US, Europe has not had a 
significant military presence in Asia since the era 
of decolonization, thus it cannot match American 
armed presence in the area. Nonetheless, the EU has 
succeeded in positioning itself as a “soft security” actor 
and a valuable contributor in terms of its diplomacy. For 
example, the EU played an important role in brokering 
a peace deal to end the insurgency in the Aceh province 
of Indonesia, as well as in the Mindanao region of the 
Philippines, and contributed to improving the political 
situation in East Timor. Moreover, EU diplomacy has 
provided key support for the Northeast Asia Peace and 
Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) process, launched in 
2013 by South Korea.[22] The EU’s support for NAPCI 
has allowed it to lead anti-piracy operations in the Gulf 
of Aden in cooperation with several Asian countries, as 
well as organize high-level seminars for ASEAN about 
maritime security. Furthermore, the EU and its member 
states were also influential in pushing for enhanced 
UN sanctions against North Korea following its nuclear 
testing.[23]
For all these reasons, the EU’s growing strategic 
presence in Asia as a “soft security actor” makes it 
well positioned to act as a mediator should tensions 
escalate over a number of key flashpoints, including 
the situation in the South China Sea, Taiwan and North 
Korea. For example, the EU was already called upon to 
help resolve the 2008 crisis in Georgia following Russia’s 
military intervention, a precedent that underlines 
the EU’s potential.[24] While it can be interpreted as 
a weakness, the EU’s lack of hard military power is 
arguably its greatest asset. This is because countries 
such as India or China do not view the EU as threatening 
in the same way as the US. China interpreted Obama’s 
“pivot to Asia”, for example, as a thinly disguised form 
of containment, since the economic aspect of the US 
pivot was accompanied by an impressive redeployment 
of the American war machine, including the patrolling 
of several US fleets in waters surrounding China.
[25] By contrast, the EU relies on its economic clout 
as the world’s largest single market to provide it with 
sufficient authority on the international stage, without 
threatening key interlocutors. Therefore, the EU’s 
position as a “soft security actor” may provide it with 
key leverage to bring China and other Asian countries 
to the negotiating table should the need arise.
One of the main crisis points in East Asia is linked to 
competition over access to a set of islands and maritime 
claims in the South China Sea, the largest of which are 
the Spratly and Paracel Islands.[26] The main subject 
of the dispute is control over strategically important 
shipping lanes, which Chinese nuclear submarines rely 
on to reach the open sea, as well as fishing rights and 
potential exploitation of crude oil and natural gas in the 
seabed. China’s economic rise has made it increasingly 
assertive in its maritime claims; over the last decade, 
Beijing has launched a policy of island building, 
establishing sophisticated infrastructure such as sea 
ports, airports and lighthouses that could potentially 
have a military purpose. Beijing regards the islands in 
the South China Sea as essential for controlling vital 
shipping lanes, as well as a symbolic issue linked to 
its rise in status as a great power. The US is bound by 
treaty to provide protection to a number of countries 
involved in the dispute such as the Philippines, and 
has an extensive network of military bases in the 
21. European External Action 
Service, EU-Asia Security 
Factsheet. 
22. The Diplomat, Northeast 
Asia, Trust and the NAPCI, 18 
December 2015.
23. Ibid. 
24. France, under the 
leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy, 
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presidency of the EU Council 
to lead diplomatic efforts to 
bring Putin and his Georgian 
counterpart to the negotiating 
table for a ceasefire and 
peace accord. See: Lefebvre 
M., Russia and the West: ten 
disputes and an inevitable 
escalation?, Policy Paper for the 
Robert Schuman Foundation, 
European Issue n°379, January 
2016.
25. Cheng L., Assessing 
US-China relations under the 
Obama administration, The 
Brookings Institution, 30 August 
2016. 
26. There are many nations 
involved in the dispute, 
including China, Taiwan, 
Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Vietnam. 
See: Steinberg B. and O’Hanlon 
M. E., Can Donald Trump 
avoid a dangerous showdown 
in the South China Sea?, 
The Brookings Institution, 20 
January 2017.
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region. Tensions escalated further after China openly 
disregarded a ruling by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in July 2016, where the tribunal rejected 
China’s maritime claims to the islands and ruled in 
favor of the Philippines.[27]
 
Europe should adopt on a two-pronged strategy in the 
South China Sea. First, the EU can rely on its strategic 
presence in the region to try to ensure that the terms 
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
are respected by all relevant actors, as this is essential 
to its efforts in upholding international law. Despite 
China’s shrill insistence that the Philippines violated 
the 2002 Bilateral Declaration of Conduct regarding 
South China Sea disputes, Manila had already tried to 
settle the Spratly dispute through bilateral discussions 
that excluded any third-party procedure.[28] Under 
UNCLOS section XV on the settlement of disputes, 
Manila did not explicitly ask for the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration to rule on whether China, the Philippines, or 
some other state holds or should hold sovereignty over 
any of the geological features or maritime zones of the 
South China Sea. According to the convention language, 
UNCLOS has no authority to make such judgments. 
Its purpose is ‘to provide a legal order identifying the 
characteristics of the marine environment and the 
rights and responsibilities of nations regarding the use 
of that environment’.[29] China’s categorical refusal 
to participate and rejection of the arbitration decision 
speaks more to the fundamental Sino-Western division 
over the application of international agreements to 
sovereignty issues, than to the content of the decision 
itself.[30]
Yet, there is a growing awareness in Beijing that its 
stance on the arbitration order is having a substantively 
negative impact on its prestige and influence in the 
region.[31] Consequently, Europe should take seriously 
China’s claim that its building spree on shallow atolls 
is testimony to its efforts to ‘safeguard navigation 
freedom and security’ in the South China Sea.[32] 
For example, the EU could propose to mediate an 
agreement that would help limit the militarization of 
the sea. For China, this might involve limits on what 
types of weapons systems it can deploy on land-based 
platforms; for the US, this could include limitations on 
American surveillance operations in waters sensitive to 
China. The EU could also propose a timetable for the 
negotiation of a code of conduct amongst the claimant 
nations, which would cover, for example, fishing rights 
or access to energy resources. Regarding fishing rights, 
the EU could propose that all fleets freely fish within 
certain caps designed to prevent overfishing that do 
not interfere with rival maritime claims. Finally, the EU 
could incite China to clearly state that the so-called 
“nine-dash line” is aimed only at delineating China’s 
claims to islands and does not represent any claim to 
maritime rights. This could help to mitigate China’s 
disregard of the Law of the Sea and appease some of 
the tensions in the region. 
It is unlikely that the EU’s position as a soft security 
actor will be as effective with respect to Taiwan. Since 
the end of the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan has been a 
self-governing entity detached from Communist rule in 
mainland China.[33] Nonetheless, Beijing has always 
wanted to reunite with Taiwan; thus, it has never 
recognized the de facto separation. It has insisted 
that diplomatic relations with a foreign country are 
contingent on the “one-China” policy, which involves 
recognizing the regime in Beijing as the only official 
representative for the whole of China. There is a risk 
that the current status quo over Taiwan could break 
down in the near future. The US is bound by the 
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 to protect Taiwan from 
any military aggression from Beijing, and has been 
supplying the ROC with substantial military equipment 
as a deterrent since the 1980’s. Gradually, public 
opinion in Taiwan is turning against reunification with 
the Chinese mainland, as the younger generation has 
become accustomed to democracy and independence. 
This has led many officials in Beijing to believe that 
reunification may have to take place before it is too 
late, by force if necessary.[34]
 
As in the South China Sea, the EU could exert quiet 
pressure on both Taipei and Beijing to encourage them 
to engage in broader dialogue. Since May 2016, the 
pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
has held power in Taiwan; President Tsai Ing-wen has 
refused to officially endorse the “one-China” principle 
(even though she has accepted the status quo). Beijing 
27. Phillips T., Holmes O. and 
Bowcott O., Beijing rejects 
tribunal's ruling in South China 
Sea case, The Guardian, 12 
July 2016. 
28. Swain M. D., « Chinese 
Views on the South China Sea 
Arbitration Case between the 
People’s Republic of China 
and the Philippines », China 





32. Li J., « Zhubi Reef 
lighthouse comes to life in 
South China Sea », China Daily, 
7 April 2016. 
33. The regime in mainland 
China is known as the “People’s 
Republic of China”, or PRC, 
while the regime in Taiwan 
is known as the “Republic of 
China”, or ROC.
34. Bader J. A., US-China 
relations: Time for China to step 
up, The Brookings Institution, 
12 January 2017.
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has responded by breaking-off diplomatic contact and 
launched a campaign to isolate Taiwan. Firstly, the EU 
should encourage Beijing to resume official contact 
with the government in Taipei and not base diplomatic 
relations on the outcome of elections in Taiwan. 
Moreover, the EU could try to convince President Tsai to 
soften her stance and be more flexible over the “one-
China principle”. Second, the EU could encourage the 
PRC to accept that the ROC join ongoing negotiations 
with 16 other countries over the Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP). Likewise, Europe should 
rely on its influence within the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), where several European 
countries are members (including Germany, France 
and Italy), to ensure that Taiwan has the opportunity to 
participate as an observer. This would help to reinforce 
economic ties between the PRC and the ROC, without 
Beijing losing face or sacrificing any core principles. 
The most serious crisis point in East Asia probably has 
to do with the situation over North Korea. Since the 
signing of the Armistice in 1953 and the separation 
of the country, the North has been governed by a 
brutal dictatorial regime, which has been developing 
a clandestine nuclear program.[35] The situation 
has deteriorated substantially since the accession of 
Kim Jong-un in late 2011 as the new supreme leader. 
Over the last few years, North Korea has expanded 
its nuclear arsenal, conducting a variety of provocative 
missile launch tests. Pyongyang claims to be capable 
of carrying out a nuclear strike against Japan or South 
Korea. This has prompted US President Trump to react 
forcefully by inciting China, North Korea’s only ally, to 
apply more pressure on the regime. As a result, Beijing 
has recently reduced its coal trading with North Korea, 
sending a clear signal that China is ready to assume 
a more proactive stance.[36] Trump has confirmed 
unwavering US support to key allies such as Japan and 
South Korea and reinforced US military presence in the 
region, including the deployment of the controversial 
THAAD missile defense system. The situation in the 
Korean peninsula could well escalate, since China sees 
the THAAD missile system as a provocative gesture. 
Indeed, US Secretary of State Tillerson underlined 
during a visit to South Korea that US patience with 
North Korea was running out and that it was considering 
pre-emptive military action.[37]
Unlike the situation in Taiwan or the South China Sea, 
providing “diplomatic good offices” is not an effective 
strategy regarding North Korea. Indeed, mediation and 
good offices have already been tried by the US over 
the last two decades with little success. Instead, the 
EU should seek to work closely with the new President 
of South Korea to bring together all relevant actors 
in order to renew dialogue and help find possible 
solutions. South Korean President Moon Jae-in has 
been elected in part on a platform to improve dialogue 
with the belligerent north. First, the EU should seek 
to convene the US, China, South Korea and Japan to 
launch regularly scheduled closed-door negotiations on 
ways to bring about a future nuclear-free and unified 
Korea. The EU should encourage greater shared 
intelligence regarding North Korea’s nuclear program 
and a broader dialogue on political and military 
coordination. Second, the EU should ask that Beijing 
accelerate its trade pressure on North Korea and follow-
up its limited coal selling with more forceful measures. 
Third, Europe should rely on its influence within the 
UN system, including the Security Council, to push for 
greater sanctions against North Korea. The aim would 
be to force Pyongyang back to the negotiating table 
to avoid complete international isolation and economic 
collapse. The EU and its member states could also offer 
inducements such as upgrading diplomatic relations, or 
even perhaps a relaxation of the international economic 
embargo, depending on the level of cooperation from 
North Korea. 
***
The pivot to Asia may well become one of the most 
important foreign policy transitions for Europe in the 
years to come. This pivot must contain an economic 
as well as a security dimension, since the two are 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. The EU 
should consolidate its network of bilateral trade deals in 
the region, bringing to conclusion ongoing negotiations 
and opening trade talks with new countries. Moreover, 
the EU should also consolidate multilateral cooperation 
with regional organizations such as ASEAN, SAARC, 
NAPCI, or the AIIB, as well as strengthen cooperation 
35. The first successful North 
Korean nuclear test was in 2006, 
followed by several others in 
2009, 2013 and 2016.
36. The Economist, China and 
North Korea: Shock and ore, 
February 25th – March 3rd 2017. 
37. BBC news, Rex Tillerson on 
North Korea: Military action 'an 
option', 17 March 2017.
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with China within the UNFCCC to preserve the Paris 
accord. Reinforcing links with Asia is a sensible 
strategy, as the region is projected to continue its 
strong economic growth during the so-called “Asian 
century”.
 
The EU’s strategic presence in the region puts it in an 
ideal position to carry out this role. However, it will 
need to be flexible depending on the issue at stake 
and utilize a range of diplomatic tools. Likewise, 
establishing any kind of close “special relationship” 
with a country such as China would risk undermining 
core European democratic values given Beijing’s 
poor human rights record, aggressive foreign policy 
and increasingly authoritarian domestic censorship. 
Moreover, this would allow China to legitimize its 
concept of “regime neutrality” by dissociating domestic 
politics from good behavior on the international stage, 
a dangerous precedent. For all these reasons, the best 
policy for Europe should be to strike a delicate balance. 
This would involve pivoting towards Asia by reinforcing 
strategic presence in the region; at the same time, 
Europe must seek to preserve and extend democratic 
values to counter China’s recent efforts to promote 
regime neutrality within the international system.
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